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Abstract Food security in China, the world’s most populous country, has long been
a concern because of the challenges of population growth, water shortages, and
loss of cropland through urbanization, soil degradation, and climate change. Here,
we present an integrated analysis of China’s food demand and supply under IPCC
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios A1, A2, B1, and B2 in 2020, 2050, and 2080,
based on official statistics and future development scenarios. Our analysis accounts
for future socioeconomic, technological, and resource developments, as well the
impact of climate change. We present a covariant relationship between changes in
cereal productivity due to climate change and the cereal harvest area required to
satisfy China’s food demand. We also estimated the effects of changing harvested
areas on the productivity required to satisfy the food demand; of productivity
changes due to climate change on the harvest area required to satisfy food demand;
and of productivity and land use changes on the population at risk of undernutrition.
China could be able to feed herself without disturbing the global food market in
the twenty-first century, but whether the government will choose self-sufficiency or
increased food imports may depend on the cost of change, which remains unknown.
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1 Introduction
Despite impressive success in increasing the food supply to meet the demands of
rapidly growing populations during the past few decades, concerns over the ability
of developing countries to sustain their people and over possible impacts on the
global food market have not decreased. For example, on the basis of projections
to 2020, the International Food Policy Research Institute has expressed serious
concerns about whether the world food production system will be able to feed the
projected population, especially in the face of a possibly stagnant or even declining
stock of natural resources (Rosegrant et al. 2001). The World Research Institute
has stated that the challenge of meeting human needs seems destined to grow ever
more difficult (WRI 2000). This issue also concerns the UN Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO). According to their projections, the increase in crop production
in developing countries from 1995–1997 to 2030 will be only 70%, versus 175%
over the preceding 34-year period (FAO 2001). The impact of global changes in
food security is becoming a serious concern (e.g., Parry et al. 2004; Easterling et al.
2007). Because of climate change, regional differences in crop production are likely
to grow stronger over time, leading to increased regional disparities, with substantial
increases in the risk of hunger among poorer nations, especially under scenarios of
greater inequality (Parry et al. 2004).
Food security in China, one of the largest and most populous countries in
the world, has been a major concern since at least the 1990s (e.g., Brown 1995;
Heilig 1999; Tao et al. 2003, 2008; CHINAGRO 2005; Lin et al. 2005; Xiong et al.
2007). Because of the challenges caused by population growth, water shortages
(Tao et al. 2003), loss of cropland due to urbanization (Liu et al. 2005a, b), soil
degradation (Tao et al. 2005), and climate change (Tao et al. 2006), the need for
reliable predictions of food production and potential adaptation options has become
increasingly important. Future food demand and supply are strongly related to the
country’s future population, economy, technology, resources, climate, and other
factors. Current studies have generally failed to comprehensively account for changes
and adaptations in future land-use, socioeconomic and technological scenarios. More
integrated multidisciplinary studies are needed to provide reasonable scenarios for
future changes. However, since the problem of predicting future food production is
becoming more and more complex, the time is not yet ripe for designing a compre-
hensive coupled model that accounts for all the factors that will have a significant
influence on food production (Döös 2002). Nevertheless, recent advances in scenario
development make it possible to perform a reasonably well-integrated analysis.
For example, on the basis of an analysis of a range of development and policy
scenarios over a 30-year time horizon, CHINAGRO (2005) tried to establish an
informed policy dialogue between China and the European Union to improve food
security, farmer income, and sustainable agricultural development in China. Ewert
et al. (2005) and Rounsevell et al. (2005) predicted changes in crop productivity
and agricultural land use in Europe by using scenarios that represent alternative
economic and environmental pathways for future development.
Here, we account for the major factors in an integrated perspective on future food
demand and supply in China under Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A1 (a global economic
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world), A2 (a regional economic world), B1 (a global environmental world), and B2
(a regional environmental world) (Nakic´enovic´ and Swart 2000) in 2020, 2050, and
2080. The aims of this paper are: (1) to estimate the effects of changes in harvested
area on the productivity change required to satisfy the demand for food; (2) to
estimate the effects of changes in productivity due to climate change on the harvested
area required to satisfy food demand; and (3) to estimate the effects of productivity
and land use change on the nutritional status of China’s population.
2 General description of the model
The model we developed is based on a supply–demand equilibrium (S = D). In this
analysis, the food supply includes both domestic food production and imports. We
assume that the net import of cereals will be kept to within 5% of future food demand
owing to China’s goal of increasing its food self-sufficiency (Alexandratos 1999). The
supply from domestic food production is calculated on the basis of the available land
area (L) and productivity (P) and a term that accounts for under-supply (U , relative
to the satisfactory supply) at a given time in the future (t) compared with the present
baseline (t0). Because of the equilibrium assumption, besides the import demand (D)
is then equated to this production:
Dt
Dt0
= Lt
Lt0
Pt
Pt0
Ut0
Ut
(1)
In the model, demand is calculated from the gross domestic product (GDP) and
population. Productivity is calculated considering effects of climate change, increases
in the atmospheric CO2 concentration, and technological development. Land use
is calculated as the ratio of harvested area (here, for cereals) to the total cropland
area. Under-supply represents the total population at risk of undernutrition. GDP,
population, CO2 increase, technological development, and land use all change
depending on the assumptions of each SRES scenario.
The future change in cereal productivity is assumed to depend on technological
development, the CO2 fertilization effect, and the impacts of climate change (ex-
cluding any CO2 fertilization effect). We use the equations developed by Ewert et al.
(2005) to calculate changes in future (t) productivity (P) relative to the present
baseline (t0), as affected by climate change, increasing CO2 concentration, and
technological development, respectively:
Pt0
Pt
= 1
1 +
[(
Pt,Cl
/
Pt0 − 1
)
+
(
Pt,CO2
/
Pt0 − 1
)
+ (Pt,T
/
Pt0 − 1
)] , (2)
where Pt,Cl, Pt,CO2 , and Pt,T represent future productivity as affected by climate
change, increasing CO2 concentration, and technological development, respectively.
The effect of technological development on crop yield was estimated as:
Pt,T
Pt0
= Yr (t0) +
t=ts∫
t0
(
Yr,a · fT,Pr(t) · fT,Gr(t)
Ygp (t0)
)
dt, (3)
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where Yr(t0) is the relative yield change at t0, and ts is the scenario time period.
Yr,a represents the annual increment in the relative yield change with respect to the
baseline year t0 and is calculated from [Yr(t0) − 1]. Historical gains in potential yield
were set to 1 and fT,Pr(t) accounts for any future diversion from this gain. Ygp(t0)
represents the ratio of actual crop yields to potential yields at t0 and fT,Gr(t) represents
the ratio of actual yield to potential yield in the future.
The effect of increasing CO2 on crop yield was calculated from:
Pt,CO2
Pt0
= fCO2,r · Ct−t0
100
+ 1, (4)
where fCO2,r is the relative yield change per unit increase in CO2 and Ct−t0 is the
difference between future and present CO2 concentrations. Increases in atmospheric
CO2 concentrations for the different IPCC SRES scenarios and time slices were
projected by IMAGE-team (2001).
Our analysis focuses on estimating the:
• Effects of changes in harvested area on the productivity changes required to
satisfy the demand for food. This is obtained from Eq. 1 by rearranging it to
solve for P, with L subject to change and D held constant.
• Effects of changes in productivity due to climate change on the harvested area
required to satisfy food demand. This is obtained from Eq. 1 by rearranging it to
solve for L, with P subject to change (as a result of climate change) and D held
constant.
• Effects of productivity and land use change on under-supply (undernutrition).
This is obtained from Eq. 1 by solving it for U , with L subject to change, and P
and D held constant.
3 Estimation of model parameters
3.1 Projected development in food demand in the twenty-first century
3.1.1 Relationship between per capita annual food demand and GDP
There is a robust relationship between per capita annual food demand and per capita
GDP based on data from 1961 to 2003 (Fig. 1). The population and GDP data were
obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook, published by China Statistics Press
(Beijing). The GDP was converted into 1990 US$ by using the 1990 market exchange
rate to match the unit of projected GDP for future (Gaffin et al. 2004) Annual food
demand for the period was calculated from domestic consumption of cereals and
meat, on the basis of the statistical databases of FAO (FAO 2004). Consumption of
cereals includes rice, wheat, maize, and other grains used directly as food, as seed, in
the manufacture of processed foods, and for other related uses. The consumption of
meat (mainly pork, poultry, and beef) was converted into a cereal equivalent by using
conversion factors (7.0 kg grain/kg beef, 4 kg grain/kg pork, 2 kg grain/kg poultry)
provided by the Food Climate Research Network (http://www.fcrn.org.uk). Annual
per capita food demand was then calculated by dividing the annual food demand by
the population.
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Fig. 1 Regression relationship
between per capita annual
food demand and per capita
GDP (in 1990 US$). The
regression equation is:
y = 74.72 + 42.16ln(x− 30.37),
r2 = 0.98, n = 43
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3.1.2 Projected development in food demand in the twenty-first century
We estimated China’s future population and GDP for IPCC scenarios A1, A2, B1,
and B2 on the basis of the values of these parameters in 2000 (National Bureau of
Statistics of China 2005) and projected growth rates. The latter were calculated from
downscaled socioeconomic scenarios for future population and GDP at the country
level (Gaffin et al. 2004), as based on the recent IPCC SRES (Nakic´enovic´ and Swart
2000). The scenarios cover a wide range of future changes in population and GDP
(Fig. 2). The A2 scenario projects the greatest increase in population. In contrast,
population is projected to decrease after a peak at around 2020 under the A1 and B1
scenarios and to stabilize under the B2 scenario. GDP is projected to increase most
under the A1 scenario.
We applied the robust relationship between per capita annual food demand
and GDP, together with the projected population and GDP scenarios to project
future food demand. The projected per capita annual food demand depended on
the scenario, with the highest value under scenario A1 and the smallest value under
scenario A2 (Table 1). It ranges from 412.1 to 449.6 kg cereal grain per year in 2020,
from 445.4 to 524.2 kg cereal grain per year in 2050, and from 476.6 to 562.4 kg cereal
grain per year in 2080. Together with the projected population, total food demand is
projected to increase most under scenario A2 owing to its projected sharp increase in
population. In contrast, under scenarios A2 and B1, total food demand is projected
to decrease after peaking in around 2040, in response to the projected decrease in
population after peaking in around 2020 (Fig. 3).
3.2 Future cereal productivity
We used China’s historical cereal yield data and the method of Ewert et al. (2005) to
estimate changes in cereal productivity due to technological advances and the CO2
fertilization effect, respectively. China’s historical cereal yield data were obtained
from the FAO (2004) statistical databases. The relative yield change at the base
year (i.e., the ratio of yield in 2000 to yield in 1999) was set to 1.019. We assumed
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Fig. 2 Future population and
GDP in China as projected for
IPCC scenarios A1, A2, B1,
and B2
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that the present actual crop yields are about 75% of the potential yields. From
these assumptions, the changes in cereal productivity due to technological advances
and the CO2 fertilization effect are shown in Fig. 4. The relative yield change
per unit increase in CO2 concentration was set to 0.08% ppm−1, suggesting that
doubling the present CO2 concentration would increase crop yield by about 30%
(Ewert et al. 1999). Cereal productivity is projected to increase most in response
to CO2 fertilization and technological development under the A1FI scenario as a
result of relatively high atmospheric CO2 concentrations and rapid technological
development. In contrast, the contribution of technological development to cereal
productivity is projected to decrease from 2050 to 2080 under scenarios B2 and B1.
Table 1 Projected per capita
annual food demand (in kg
cereal grain) in China for
IPCC scenarios A1, A2, B1,
and B2
Year A1 A2 B1 B2
2000 381.5 381.5 381.5 381.5
2020 449.6 412.1 423.0 443.5
2050 524.2 445.4 482.0 488.3
2080 562.4 476.6 530.3 511.7
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Fig. 3 Observed and
projected food demand in
China for IPCC scenarios A1,
A2, B1, and B2
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Fig. 4 Projected cereal
productivity change due to
CO2 fertilization effects
(upper) and technology
development (down) for IPCC
scenarios A1, A2, B1, and B2
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Fig. 5 Observed and
projected total cropland area
in China for IPCC scenarios
A1, A2, B1, and B2
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3.3 Future cropland resources
The future cereal harvest area will depend on the total future cropland area and
the ratio of cereal harvest area to the total cropland area (i.e., H/C). H/C could be
higher than 100% because harvest area could be larger than cropland area in the
region with double or triple cropping system which allows multiple harvests per year.
We assumed that China’s cropland area would have the same growth rates as the
whole Asia under all four scenarios, as was predicted by the Asian Pacific Integrated
Model (Morita et al. 1994). The cropland areas in China from 1961 to 2003 were
obtained from the statistical databases of FAO (2004). We then estimated China’s
future cropland area by increasing the 2000 value by its annual growth rate. Cropland
area would increase linearly under scenarios A2 and B2, but would decrease linearly
under scenarios A1 and B1 (Fig. 5).
4 Projected impacts of changes in climate and land use on food security
4.1 Effects of changes in harvested area on the productivity change required
to satisfy the demand for food
We define food security as meaning that China can meet the food demand for all
of her population (using 95% domestic production and 5% imports) according to a
living standard based on per capita GDP in the projected year. With the H/C ratio
increasing from 20% to 100%, to satisfy the increasing demand for food, the required
change in cereal productivity due to climate change (excluding the CO2 fertilization
effect) in the four scenarios would range from −56% to 335% in 2020, from −114%
to 374% in 2050, and from −191% to 494% in 2080 on the basis of China’s cereal
yield (i.e., 4,756.4 kg/ha) in 2000 (Fig. 6). This means that if H/C were 100%, cereal
productivity could decrease by up to 56%, 114%, and 191% in 2020, 2050, and 2080,
respectively as a result of climate change, compared with the productivity in 2000,
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Fig. 6 The covariant
relationship between cereal
yield change due to climate
change and H/C to satisfy food
demand in 2020, 2050, and
2080
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without failing to meet food demand. However, if H/C were only 20%, satisfying
the demand for food would require cereal productivity to increase by no less than
335%, 374%, and 494% in 2020, 2050, and 2080, respectively, compared with the
productivity in 2000.
4.2 Effects of changes in productivity due to climate change on the harvested area
required to satisfy food demand
Previous estimates (Parry et al. 2004) showed that climate change (excluding the
CO2 fertilization effect) would decrease cereal yield in China by 2.5% to 5%, 2.5%
to 10%, 0% to 2.5%, and 2.5% to 5% in 2020 under scenarios A1FI, A2, B1, and B2,
respectively, compared with the 1990 value, versus corresponding decreases of 5% to
10%, 5% to 10%, 5% to 10%, and 5% to 10% in 2050, and 10% to 30%, 5% to 30%,
5% to 10%, and 5% to 10% in 2080. If so, satisfying food demand under scenarios
A1FI, A2, B1, and B2 would require an H/C value of at least 61% to 62%, 61% to
65%, 62% to 63%, and 79% to 81%, respectively, in 2020, versus values of 46% to
47%, 60% to 62%, 56% to 58%, and 88% to 92% in 2050 and 30% to 32%, 67%
to 77%, 49% to 50%, and 83% to 87% in 2080 (Fig. 6).
4.3 Effects of productivity and land use change on undernutrition
Using the mean impact of climate change proposed by Parry et al. (2004) for further
estimation, and with H/C changing from 20% to 100%, the number of people at risk
of undernutrition would change from 955–1,107 to −708 − −221 million in 2020s,
from 750–1,356 to −1, 251 − −44 million in 2050s, and from 381–1, 823 to −1,906 −
−125 million in 2080s (Fig. 7). This means that if H/C were 100%, besides satisfying
the food demand for all of her population, China could have food surplus. The food
surplus is equivalent amount of food demand of 221 to 708 million people in 2020s,
of 44 to 1,251 million people in 2050s, and of 125 to 1,906 million people in 2080s.
However, if H/C were only 20%, the number of people at risk of undernutrition
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Fig. 7 The changes of
population at risk of
undernutrition in response
to H/C
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would be 955 to 1,107 million in 2020s, 750 to 1,356 million in 2050s, and 381 to 1,823
million in 2080s.
5 Discussion
Our analysis shows that food security is closely related to the proportion of the
total cropland used to grow cereals (i.e., H/C). FAO data suggest that, from 1961
to 2003, China’s H/C value increased linearly from 87% in 1961 to a peak of 101%
in 1976, and then decreased sharply to 73% in 1985. After 13 years of stability, it
again decreased sharply, from 68% in 1999 to 54% in 2003 (Fig. 8). The changes in
Fig. 8 Annual change in H/C
(%) in China from 1961 to
2003
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Climatic Change (2009) 93:433–445 443
the area of cereal harvest were influenced mainly by government policy (Tong et al.
2003), market price fluctuations, and climate variability (Tao et al. 2004). Our results
suggest that H/C will have to increase to satisfy the food demand of the increasing
population. Fortunately, land resource data and historical experience suggest that
the cereal harvest area required in the future would not be beyond the capacity
of China’s land resources and the control of the government. Furthermore, climate
change (i.e., an extended growing season) would lead to an increased potential to
use multiple cropping systems. Therefore, our results suggest that China will have
the capacity to feed itself without disturbing the world food market in the twenty-
first century. The key problem with this assertion is, however, whether there is
sufficient motivation. Would the government be willing to increase C/H to maintain
agricultural self-sufficiency instead of increasing food imports? Would this strategy
prove too costly? These questions are worthy of further investigation. Alternatively,
improved resource-use efficiency and new technological development should be
greatly encouraged to boost agricultural production (Huang et al. 2002). The low
incomes of farmers and high agricultural production costs are serious obstacles to
achieving this goal.
Our analysis uses a highly integrated framework based on official statistics (e.g.,
FAO and the China Statistical Yearbook) and state-of-the-art future development
scenarios (IPCC SRES). Technology, cropland area, and per capita food demand
all change dynamically in these scenarios, which are more reasonable than the
scenarios used in previous studies. The future scenarios we used for socioeconomic
development, technological advances, land use changes, and the impacts of climate
change were obtained from integrated modelling. The robustness of our analysis is,
therefore, dependent on the reliability of the scenarios. China’s population policy
should soon lead to zero population growth and a population decline within the
modelling period. That supports the assertions in scenario A1, and this will increase
food security. In contrast, urbanization, desertification and land degradation, com-
bined with conservation, will greatly reduce the land available for agriculture. That
will decrease food security, particularly in a scenario with high population growth
and low GDP growth. Nevertheless, the approach illustrated in our paper provides
what is currently the most advanced way to imagine the future. The scenarios
(including land-use scenarios) cover a wide range of key future characteristics such
as population growth, economic development, and technological change. Therefore,
our analysis also indirectly included some important issues such as urbanization, and
competition for resources. Cereal productivity changes in response to climate change
also indirectly reflected the key issue of water resources.
As a country-level analysis, our analysis was not spatially explicit, and it did not
account for the enormous spatial and social diversity of China, which is however an
important problem (CHINAGRO 2005). In fact, there is high variation throughout
China in population density, lifestyles, crop-growing conditions, cropping patterns,
and crop yields. In addition, there are large discrepancies among the estimates of
cropland area in China (Heilig 1999; Liu et al. 2005a for a review). Estimates of the
total cropland area in China in the base year (i.e., 2000) range from 128.3 million ha
(Heilig 1999) to 137.1 million ha (FAO 2004) and 141.1 million ha (Liu et al. 2005a).
Here, we used the FAO estimate to match the source of our other statistics; although
the estimation based on Landsat TM/ETM data by Liu et al. (2005a) may be more
accurate. If using the estimates by Liu et al. (2005a), we can adopt a more optimistic
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view of the food supply; for example, in Fig. 6, the required cereal productivity
change due to climate change would be 2% to 4% less, although the general trends
and conclusions would remain the same.
6 Conclusions
We have provided an integrated perspective on China’s food demand and supply
in the twenty-first century based on official statistics and the use of state-of-the-art
future scenarios. Our scenarios cover a wide range of key future characteristics, such
as population growth, economic development, and technological change; therefore,
our analysis presents a reasonably integrated picture of China’s future food demand
and supply. We conclude that China has the potential to feed itself without disturbing
the world food market in the twenty-first century. However, whether the government
will choose self-sufficiency or increased food imports may depend on the relative
costs of these two alternatives. Given the importance of China’s food security, this
issue is worthy of further investigation.
Acknowledgements This study was supported by National Key Programme for Developing Basic
Science (Project Number 2009CB421105), China and Japan’s Innovative Program of Climate Change
Projection for the 21st Century (KAKUSHIN Program). F. Tao also acknowledges the support
of the “Hundred Talents” Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. We are grateful to the
two anonymous reviewers and editor for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this
manuscript.
References
Alexandratos N (1999) World food and agriculture: outlook for the medium and longer term. Proc
Natl Acad Sci USA 96:5908–5914
Brown LR (1995) Who will feed China? Norton, New York
CHINAGRO (2005) Policy decision support for sustainable adaptation of China’s agriculture to
globalization. www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/chinagro.html
Döös BR (2002) The problem of predicting global food production. Ambio 31:417–424
Easterling WE, Aggarwal PK, Batima P, Brander KM, Erda L, Howden SM, Kirilenko A, Morton J,
Soussana JF, Schmidhuber J, Tubiello FN (2007) Food, fibre and forest products. Climate change
2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. In: Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der
Linden PJ, Hanson CE (eds) Contribution of Working Group II to the fourth assessment report
of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
pp 273–313
Ewert F, van Oijen M, Porter JR (1999) Simulation of growth and development processes of spring
wheat in response to CO2 and ozone for different sites and years in Europe using mechanistic
crop simulation models. Eur J Agron 10:231–247
Ewert F, Rounsevell MDA, Reginster I, Metzger MJ, Leemans R (2005) Future scenarios of
European agricultural land use I. Estimating changes in crop productivity. Agric Ecosyst Environ
107:101–116
FAO (2001) Agriculture towards 2015/2030, Technical Interim Report. United Nations
Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome, Italy http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFO/
ECONOMIC/esd/at2015/chapter4.pdf
FAO (2004) FAOSTAT data: statistical database of the food and agricultural organization of the
United Nations. http://apps.fao.org
Gaffin SR, Rosenzweig C, Xing X, Yetman G (2004) Downscaling and geo-spatial gridding of socio-
economic projections from the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES). Glob
Environ Change A 14:105–123
Climatic Change (2009) 93:433–445 445
Heilig GK (1999) Can China feed itself?—a system for evaluation of policy options. Laxenburg,
IIASA. http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/LUC/ChinaFood/index_m.htm
Huang J, Carl P, Scott R (2002) Enhancing the crops to feed the poor. Nature 418:678–684
IMAGE-team (2001) The IMAGE 2.2 implementation of the SRES scenarios: a comprehensive
analysis of emissions, climate change and impacts in the 21st century. National Institute of Public
Health and the Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, The Netherlands
Lin E, Xiong W, Ju H, Xu Y, Li Y, Bai L, Xie L (2005) Climate change impacts on crop yield and
quality with CO2 fertilization in China. Phil Trans R Soc B 360:2149–2154
Liu J, Liu M, Tian H, Zhuang D, Zhang Z, Zhang W, Tang X, Deng X (2005a) Spatial and temporal
patterns of China’s cropland during 1990–2000: an analysis based on Landsat TM data. Remote
Sens Environ 98:442–456
Liu J, Zhan J, Deng X (2005b) The spatial-temporal patterns and driving forces of urban land
expansion in China during the economic reform era. Ambio 34:450–455
Morita T, Matsuoka Y, Penna I, Kainuma M (1994) Global carbon dioxide emission scenarios
and their basic assumptions: 1994 survey. CGER-1011-94, Center for Global Environmental
Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, Tsukuba, Japan
Nakic´enovic´ N, Swart R (eds) (2000) Special report on emissions scenarios. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005) China statistic yearbook 2005. China Statistics Press,
Beijing China
Parry ML, Rosenzweig C, Iglesias A, Livermore M, Fischer G (2004) Effects of climate change
on global food production under SRES emissions and socio-economic scenarios. Glob Environ
Change 14:53–67
Rosegrant MW, Paisner MS, Meijer S, Witcover J (2001) Global food projections to 2020: emerging
trends and alternative futures. The international food policy research institute, Washington D.C.,
USA, p 206
Rounsevell MDA, Ewert F, Reginster I, Leemans R, Carter TR (2005) Future scenarios of European
agricultural land use: II. Projecting changes in cropland and grassland. Agric Ecosyst Environ
107:117–135
Tao F, Yokozawa M, Hayashi Y, Lin E (2003) Future climate change, the agricultural water re-
sources, and agricultural production in China. Agric Ecosyst Environ 95:203–215
Tao F, Yokozawa M, Zhang Z, Hayashi Y, Grassl H, Fu C (2004) Variability in climatology and
agricultural production in China in association with East Asia Monsoon and EL NiÑo southern
oscillation. Clim Res 28:23–30
Tao F, Yokozawa M, Hayashi Y, Lin E (2005) A perspective on water resources in China: interac-
tions between climate change and soil degradation. Clim Change 68:169–197
Tao F, Yokozawa M, Xu Y, Hayashi Y, Zhang Z (2006) Climate changes and trends in phenology
and yields of field crops in China, 1981–2000. Agric For Meteorol 138:82–92
Tao F, Hayashi Y, Zhang Z, Sakamoto T, Yokozawa M (2008) Global warming, rice production and
water use in China: developing a probabilistic assessment. Agric For Meteorol 148:94–110
Tong C, Hall CAS, Wang H (2003) Land use change in rice, wheat and maize production in China
(1961–1998). Agric Ecosyst Environ 95:523–536
WRI (2000) World resources 2000–2001, people and ecosystems. World Resources Institute,
Washington DC, USA, p 389
Xiong W, Lin E, Ju H, Xu Y (2007) Climate change and critical thresholds in China’s food security.
Clim Change 81:205–221
